A Critical Analysis of Liverpool’s January Transfer Window Decisions

When exceptionally intelligent individuals undertake actions that seem illogical, three potential explanations arise:

1. They possess such superior intellect that their insights elude our understanding, akin to playing 4D chess while the rest of us are engaged in checkers.

2. Their intelligence may be overstated.

3. There could be undisclosed factors at play that we are unaware of.

As I analyze Liverpool’s inactivity during the recently closed January transfer window, I find myself pondering which of these scenarios is applicable. I hope for the third option, as the second would imply that Michael Edwards’s acumen has been significantly overrated, including by myself, while the first would suggest my own folly—an uncomfortable thought to entertain.

One undeniable truth going into the January window was Liverpool’s pressing need for defensive reinforcements. If you wish to dispute this assertion, allow me to elaborate. If my argument fails to convince you, feel free to redirect your attention elsewhere.

Liverpool demonstrated a clear recognition of their need for another defender, particularly a center-back, illustrated by their attempt to acquire Marc Guéhi from Crystal Palace on Deadline Day for approximately £35 million ($47 million). Unfortunately, the deal fell through while Guéhi was undergoing an MRI, and this was only in August.

A month later, Giovanni Leoni, a young central defender signed from Parma, suffered a cruciate injury that sidelined him for the remainder of the season. This left Liverpool down two defenders.

On January 8, 2026, another defender, Conor Bradley, also faced an untimely end to his season due to a knee injury, bringing the total to three missing defenders.

Moreover, among the defenders still available, one is 34 years old (Virgil van Dijk), two are set to become free agents in June (Andy Robertson and Ibrahima Konaté), and two more function primarily as wing-backs (Milos Kerkez and Jeremie Frimpong, who is currently recovering from his third hamstring injury this season). Additionally, Joe Gomez has incurred three separate injury setbacks this season, missing nearly two months due to Achilles, hamstring, and hip issues.

To be fair, Liverpool lists two other defenders on their website: Rhys Williams, who spent last season on loan at Morecambe in the fourth tier and has not played first-team football for Liverpool in over four years, and Calvin Ramsay, a once-promising right-back plagued by a series of injuries, who, at 22, has only made five league starts in the past three and a half years, all while on loan.

While it is not necessary to have depth comparable to teams like Arsenal, conventional wisdom suggests that having an insurance policy in place is vital in case of injuries or performance declines. Over the past 18 months, Liverpool has participated in 80 Champions League and Premier League matches, with Van Dijk starting 78 of them without substitution. As he turns 35 in July, one must question whether the risks taken are justifiable.

This context renders Liverpool’s inaction perplexing. They did secure a promising young central defender, Jérémy Jacquet from Rennes, but he will only join for the next season. What about the current season?

There is a prevailing theory that following significant spending last summer, budget constraints limited their January actions, and the ownership group, Fenway Sports Group, maintains a stringent financial approach. Nevertheless, if a depleted defensive roster jeopardizes a Champions League spot next season—potentially costing over €80 million in lost revenue—one must weigh the decision’s ramifications. Furthermore, a premature exit from this year’s Champions League could lead to a further loss of €30 million. Cumulatively, this adds up to a substantial amount, potentially sufficient to recruit two players like Jacquet.

It is important to note that acquiring a top-tier defender in January can be both challenging and costly. However, Liverpool merely needed a competent player who could cover minutes and perform at an acceptable level on the pitch.

During their last defensive crisis in the 2020-21 season, Liverpool successfully integrated Nat Phillips, who became a regular contributor. They finished third in the league, with Phillips starting both Champions League quarterfinal matches against Real Madrid. Is it truly credible that they couldn’t identify anyone, even on loan? Did they consider options for a promising younger player to showcase their talent or a veteran whose wages could be alleviated? Given the financial predicaments of various clubs across Europe and within the Premier League, is there truly a lack of available talent?

Interestingly, Liverpool had ample time to devise a strategy. October, November, and December constituted three months to prepare for the January window. With only one victory in six league games throughout January, it begs the question: could one new addition have made a difference?

Liverpool’s inactivity during January can be attributed to one of two conclusions. Either they attempted—and failed—to secure a player for depth and insurance, indicating an execution issue, or they genuinely believed their defensive options were sufficiently strong and durable, thus rendering additional cover unnecessary. If the latter is true, it contradicts conventional wisdom and raises serious concerns about their strategic approach. However, one must still hope for a successful outcome and trust the process.